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ABSTRACT 
Agricultural Cooperatives have been facing times of low financial risk in the previous 
years. This is soon expected to change and become an increasing concern. A review of the risk 
balancing hypothesis literature shows that previous research has not fully defined financial risk.  
 The objective of this research is to better define financial risk and analyze whether 
academic literature or the lending industry has found ways to measure financial risk. This is done 
by utilizing a stochastic simulation model of an agricultural cooperative comparing low and high 
financial risk scenarios. The results of the simulations are analyzed using coefficients of 
variations and contributions to variations for selected ratios.  
 The results show that the ratios used by the lending industry have larger contributions to 
the variation than those used in academic literature. This suggests that future research should 
work to more specifically define sources and measures of financial risk.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Many researchers have used the risk balancing hypothesis (Gabriel & Baker, 1980, Barry, 
1984) to analyze research questions facing a variety of industries. However, many of the 
researchers who have used this hypothesis for research purposes have yet to agree on how to 
measure the different components of risk. In order to analyze the risk balancing hypothesis, a 
researcher must have a way to measure financial, business, and total risk. Risk is inherent to any 
business and can not be ignored and cooperatives are not exempt to such risks. Cooperatives are 
a unique kind of business structure that has special implications when it comes to research. This 
thesis will look into how risk can be measured more accurately in regards to cooperatives 
specifically. As will be seen in the coming chapters, there is a discrepancies in how previous 
literature measures the alternative sources of risk. The previous research regarding business and 
financial risk have been shown to define business risk rather in depth whereas the definition of 
financial risk is less clear which becomes especially apparent in Parliament and Lerman (1993).  
This research aims to see if there is a better way to measure financial risk specifically, identify 
past inconsistencies and ways that these issues can be improved upon with this and future 
research. It is important to note that whenever cooperatives are referred to in this project, the 
term is specifically referring to traditional agricultural cooperatives in the United States. This 
project dealt specifically with farm supply and marketing cooperatives and therefore, will only 
focus on the unique characteristics and analysis of such cooperatives.   
1.1. Problem Statement and Study Objectives 
 Risk can be broadly defined as an exposure to danger, harm, or loss. Business risk is 
more precisely defined as the variability or uncertainty of the firm's operating income (Zeuli, 
1999). The farmer member is sometimes motivated to join a cooperative by its ability to mitigate 
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its farm’s risk. Risk management is especially crucial to the cooperative sector as the members 
are not only exposed to the risks of their own farming operating but also to those facing the 
cooperative that they patronize. The cooperative by definition is funded by its farmer members 
and therefore, when the cooperative loses money the farmer members' investment is also 
affected. Farm profits are linked to cooperative profits by virtue of the fact that farmers have 
invested in the cooperative (Zeuli, 1999). Cooperatives are like any other business and are 
concerned with making a profit but because of the cooperative nature of the business this is not 
their only objective. It is important to keep the farmer members of the cooperative in order to 
thrive. Therefore, it is important for the cooperative to have plans in place to deal with riskier 
environments, especially since it affects its own profitability and that of its members.  
 The major issue that has been found in previous literature is that there is a vague 
definition of financial risk provided by researchers. Whereas, business risk has been defined by 
many. In research it is important to be able to define and understand what an issue is so that it 
can then be measured and dealt with. Therefore, one of the main objectives of this study is to 
more precisely define financial risk so that it may then be measured. The intention by doing so is 
that cooperatives may be able to better understand their exposure to financial risk and implement 
better financial risk management techniques, and by extension the farmer members’ income as 
well.  
 After the financial risk component is more accurately defined this research project will 
attempt to measure it using indicators previous researchers have used as well as those used by 
lenders. This will hopefully provide insight for future research regarding ratios which are useful 
for financial risk analysis. Financial risk itself has not been considered to be directly measurable 
by many of the previous research articles written. It is important to note that most researchers use 
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the same ratios found in previous research to analyze investor owned firms (IOFs), which may 
lead into its own set of problems as well. It is important to only compare cooperatives to other 
cooperatives when using these ratios. The unique ways that cooperatives operate make it difficult 
to directly compare IOF performance using the same ratios. While cooperatives can and do 
perform well, their unique characteristics mean that their performance will be captured better in 
different ways. Agricultural based lender ratios will be analyzed as well because they are trying 
to directly measure financial risk as it relates to cooperatives. While this hasn’t been used for 
research purposes in the past it could be a useful tool that has been overlooked in the past and 
that could contribute valuable insights for future research. 
 The research question this project aims to answer is whether or not commonly used 
financial performance measures are capturing the effects of financial risk on cooperative 
performance. The hypothesis of this project is that there is not a significant difference in ability 
to measure financial risk whether using ratios found in the academic literature or those used by 
agricultural lenders. 
1.2. Unique Cooperative Characteristics 
 “A cooperative is a user-owned and user-controlled business that distributes benefits on 
the basis of use” (Cobia, 1989). To understand why cooperatives are unique compared to their 
IOF counterparts it is important to understand some of the unique characteristics of the 
cooperative business model. One of the first distinctions is that while cooperatives are considered 
profit focused businesses this is not their only concern. The primary objective of a cooperative is 
rather the economic benefits for members. Historically, cooperatives were started as a response 
to a market imperfection and had certain benefits to members that enticed them to become a 
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member of a cooperative rather than to continue to do business with an IOF that wasn’t serving 
their needs.  
 The principles that cooperatives employ are the first thing that make it unique relative to 
other business structures. The traditional set of cooperative business have been in place for 
almost 200 years. These include; voluntary and open membership, democratic member control, 
member’s economic participation, autonomy and independence, education, training and 
information, cooperation among cooperatives and concern for community. The primary purpose 
of these principles is to guide members, managers, and directors on how to conduct themselves 
as part of the cooperative business model. An in depth description of these principles can be 
found in Cobia (1989).  
 The principles of the cooperative are the underlying motivation for how the cooperative 
uniquely operates compared to its IOF counterparts. The main differences are typically found 
within governance, finance, taxation and the benefit components of the cooperative model. The 
purpose of this project is not to teach the reader about cooperative businesses therefore, these 
topics will only be briefly touched upon. However, the reader can get a greater understanding of 
the cooperative business model from Cobia (1989), Frederick, et al.’s USDA publication (1997) 
and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Cooperatives website (2017).  
 The governance of cooperatives is provided by the members of the cooperative. Anyone 
can be a patron of a cooperative but to become a member a person must have an equity 
investment in the cooperative. Cooperatives are owned by the members who have an equity 
investment within the cooperative and choose to be a patron of the cooperative. Anyone may be 
a patron of a cooperative but that does not mean they are a member. Members have democratic 
control over the cooperative as they vote directly on the articles of incorporation, bylaws, 
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mergers, dissolution and which fellow members will serve on the board of directors. Voting in 
cooperatives is one member, one vote not by equity as is typically found in IOFs.  
 Finance and taxation will be described in greater detail in Chapter 3. Therefore, 
discussion of these unique characteristics will be omitted in this section.  
 As previously was stated, cooperatives have historically been created as a response to 
imperfections in the marketplace. Because equity investments are required of members it is 
important that some distinction in the benefits received is made clear to members to get them to 
make an equity investment and patronize the cooperative. Benefits can include but are not 
limited to; local control, competitive yardstick effect, missing services being provided, increased 
market power, market supply assurance, returns of profits (patronage refunds), coordination of 
inputs and risk reduction. This is a small sample of benefits found by being a member of a 
cooperative and these benefits look differently for every member. These are also expanded on in 
the previous resources listed.  
1.3. Organization of the Thesis 
 This thesis is separated into six chapters. Chapter I is an introduction to the study 
containing a brief description of what makes cooperatives unique and the motivating factors for 
this study. Chapter II presents a review of literature providing insight into previous studies 
related to this thesis. Chapter III discusses the methodology that is used to analyze the ratios 
affected by business and financial risk faced by cooperatives. Chapter IV describes the data used 
to acquire our results described by the previous chapter. Chapter V presents the results of the 
study. Chapter VI provides the summary and recommendations for future research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the previous research that has been done relating 
to risk measures and agriculture cooperatives. Cooperative research is typically not as extensive 
as research related to other areas of agriculture, therefore, it was necessary to analyze previous 
research done relating to risk and agriculture in a more general sense. However, helpful insights 
were also gained through this avenue.   
2.1. Risk Balancing 
Cooperatives have typically been considered as an extension of the farm as they provide 
the services that farmers require to run their farm efficiently. There are also added incentives to 
join a cooperative because of the added ownership that comes with being a member of a 
cooperative. Risk can typically be categorized into two major categories: business and financial 
risk. Five major sources of business risk are defined by Barry (1984) and include; production or 
technical, market or price, technological, legal and social and human sources of risk. The only 
financial risk definition offered by Barry (1984) is that the financial risks are only those 
associated with debt financing. Therefore, it can be assumed that this would refer to changes in 
interest rates and terms of credit. The author goes on to explain that financial risk is 
immeasurable and can only be found by dividing total risk by business risk. This is where the 
problem of defining financial risk begins. To control for business risk cooperatives will attempt 
to adjust their financial risk leading to the concept of the risk balancing which will be discussed 
in this section. While the objective of this research is not to find the optimal mix of financial and 
business risk, these concepts are the driving forces behind this research. As will be seen in the 
next section, business risk is relatively well defined whereas financial risk is not. As stated 
before, to begin to measure something one must first be able to define that variable.  
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2.1.1. Concepts of Business and Financial Risk  
 Gabriel and Baker (1980) first introduced the risk balancing concept. This article defined 
business risk as the risk inherent to the firm, independent of how the business is financed (Van 
Horne, 1974) and is reflected in the variability of net operating income. Financial risk is then 
defined as the added variability of net cash flows to the owners of equity that results from the 
fixed financial obligation associated with debt financing and cash leasing (Barges, 1963). Total 
risk is not specifically defined by rather viewed as the business and financial risk. The article 
was able to find support of the hypothesis at the individual farm level, an increase in the business 
risk would cause a decrease in the financial risk and vice versa. This was found by examining 
how an exogenous shock affected the level of the farm’s business risk. The producers then 
responded to the business risk with offsetting financial adjustments leading to an increase or 
decrease in financial risk. However, the research was unable to capture the hypothesis’ presence 
in the aggregate data. The authors concluded that this could be attributed to characteristics such 
as risk aversion, farm size, or farm type. The authors believed that further research could 
improve on the aggregate data research. However, observing how business risk decisions affect 
individual farm’s decision making processes over time may be a difficult data set to obtain. The 
presence of the hypothesis at the farm level should not be ignored however as this has 
considerable importance. 
2.1.2. Expected Utility, Debt-Equity Structure, and Risk Balancing 
 Collins (1985) provided an alternative approach on the research of Gabriel and Baker to 
the risk balancing hypothesis. Collins defines the business risk as the variance of the rate of 
return on assets (ROA). The financial risk is defined as the magnitude of the leverage multiplier, 
which is the variance of the rate of return on equity (ROE). Total risk is not explicitly defined. 
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This paper was written to help understand how financial risk and business risk were related at the 
farm level when there are changes in regards to the implementation of agricultural policy. This 
theoretical model includes a significant contribution because it provides a way for producers to 
calculate their optimal leverage decision. These findings supported the previous study finding 
that a decrease in business risk would produce a response to increase financial leverage for the 
farm. 
2.1.3. Optimal Capital Structure in Centralized Agricultural Cooperatives 
 Barton, et al. (1996) expanded on the Collins Risk Balancing Hypothesis paper. This 
paper applied the Risk Balancing hypothesis analysis at the cooperative level. The paper used the 
same measures for business and financial risk as the previous article. The question of equity and 
optimal solvency becomes more complicated in a cooperative because of members decision to 
patronize or not. This has a large effect on the amount of equity a cooperative has. Also, it is not 
reasonable to assume non-stochastic interest rate at the cooperative level. Adding the stochastic 
interest rate also gave a better model of exogenous risk. The study found that a .5% increase in 
interest rates caused the optimal solvency ratio to double whereas a similar percentage change in 
the variance of interest rates had a much less dramatic effect. This research was performed on 
cooperatives during a time when interest rate concerns were high among the agriculture sector 
(1984 -1992) and provides useful insights even in times when interest rates are less of a concern 
for agriculture. 
2.1.4. The Paradox of Risk Balancing: Do Risk Reducing Policies Lead to More Risk For 
Farmers? 
 Cheng and Gloy (2008) took a new approach to the risk-balancing paradox in regards to 
risk-reducing farm policies. Similar to the previous article, the authors argued that previous 
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research looking into the risk-balancing paradox with government intervention failed to take into 
account stochastic interest rates. Business risk is not explicitly defined but can be assumed to be 
the variability in net income as the financial risk is defined as the variability of ROE as the 
previous articles state. The authors felt that a stochastic interest rate would have too large of an 
effect on the financial leverage of the farm to be ignored and assuming it was non-stochastic 
wasn’t realistic for farmers. The authors analyzed how stochastic ROA and interest rates would 
affect the risk balancing equation and found results that didn’t agree with previous studies. 
However, when the authors performed a numerical example the risk-balancing hypothesis was 
found to hold true in all but three years of the study. The authors concluded that risk-reducing 
farm policies may increase the risk of farm failure by inducing increased leverage adjustments 
causing an increase in the income volatility.  
2.1.5. Risk and Equity in Agricultural Cooperatives 
 Parliament and Lerman (1993) examined how risk affects the proportion of equity held 
by agricultural cooperatives. Equity has an important role in determining lending opportunities 
for any type of business structure. The authors asked if traditional measures of risk would have 
an effect on the proportion of equity held by the cooperative. Cross-sectional time-series data 
from the financial statements for fifty-nine agricultural cooperatives from 1973 to 1987. The 
model was determined to be a function of business risk, financial risk and size to determine the 
proportion of equity capital held by the firm. Business risk was measured by the variability of the 
earnings before interest and tax. More precisely, this paper measured business risk as the 
standard deviation of ROA. Financial risk was considered to be immeasurable so total risk was 
calculated as the ROE before tax minus business risk. This was an important finding as this 
begins to show the discrepancies in measuring business and financial risk. The model also took 
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into consideration the type of commodity handled and whether pooling was used or not. This 
research provided incentives to find ways to better understand financial risk faced by 
cooperatives and ratios that would measure this type of risk. It was felt that using more 
cooperative specific analysis for the risk components could lead to useful advances in 
cooperative research. 
 As expected, risk was found to have an effect on the proportion of equity held in 
cooperatives. The researchers hypothesized correctly that the business risk coefficient would be 
significant and negative, whereas the financial risk coefficient would be significant and positive. 
The size variable was found to have a negative effect on the proportion of equity but was only 
statistically significant at the 15-percent level of significance. 
2.1.6. Economic Risk and the Structural Characteristics of Farm Businesses  
Barry, et al. (2001) looked at the effect that farm size, financial structure, and other 
structural characteristics of farms had on the variability of net farm income. The question was 
posed because of the 1996 Farm Bill decoupling production and price supports, which was 
expected to cause greater variability in farm net income. The goal of the project was to discover 
how “economic risks are distributed across farms with different business and structural 
characteristics” (Barry, et al., 2001). To do so, financial and business risk measures were taken 
into consideration. Business risk was again defined as the variance of ROA. The only statement 
made by the authors about financial risk was that it “may substantially influence the variability 
of returns on equity and the stability of farm equity” (Barry, et al., 2001). Farm level data of 
farms enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association was used. This 
allowed the researchers to gain access to the certified income statements for 213 farms over the 
time period of 1980-1996. The total risk was determined to be measurable by the coefficient of 
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variation (COV) of real net farm income, which then became the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable became a three year moving COV after running the time series model to 
achieve better results. The independent variables were; farm sizes, relative prices and yields, 
farm type, life cycle (farmer’s age), financial structure, and location. This paper ties in with the 
research being presented in this thesis because it gives ideas on how to measure both business 
risk and financial risk as it relates to the farm. Cooperatives are considered an extension of a 
farmers’ own enterprise so this provides useful insight into what is affected by total risk and how 
to measure such things as business and financial risk.  
After redefining the model to include a three year moving COV on the real net farm 
income the results showed many statistically significant results with the independent variables. It 
was discovered that there was an inverse relationship between farm size and farm income 
variability, which was an expected result. Yield and price indices both had a negative and 
significant effect. This means that high income variability is associated with farms having lower 
relative yield indices as well as farmers’ receiving higher crop prices would be associated with 
lower vulnerability in the variability of their net farm income. The age variable also had a 
significant effect on the dependent variable. However, if was difficult for the researchers to 
establish the systematic influence this had on the income variability. A higher level of enterprise 
diversity was found to be associated with less income variability but this risk-reducing effect 
could be reduced by the advantages of having specialization and therefore comparative 
advantage. Therefore, lenders and farmers tend to place less emphasis on diversity as a type of 
risk management. The geographic regions had different implications on each variable. This 
research shows the importance of considerations for structural and demographic variables when 
making policy decisions in regards to the Farm Bill.  
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2.2. Measuring Risk Related to Agriculture and Cooperatives 
 While the risk balancing hypothesis is a major contributor to the literature review, this 
paper will start by looking into how other researchers have attempted to measure risk as it relates 
to agricultural cooperatives in the past. This sections provides the background for which 
academic literature ratios were used in this project.  
2.2.1. Financial Ratio Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives 
 Messina, et al. (1994) performed financial ratio analysis specifically related to 
agricultural cooperatives. The authors recognized that cooperatives operate very differently from 
their IOF counterparts and therefore should not be analyzed in the same way. If a cooperative 
plans to use financial ratios to analyze their performance it is important the cooperative only 
compares itself to other cooperatives and that the cooperative compares the performance to itself 
over time. It is relevant for cooperatives to use the same ratios that IOFs use but it is not accurate 
to compare those results with one another because these ratios fail to account for the member 
benefits a cooperative provides. The paper analyzed cooperative performance in four main 
categories: liquidity, activity, leverage and profitability. The ratios included in each category 
were as follows: liquidity included the current and sales to working capital ratios; activity 
included the asset turnover and sales to receivable ratios; leverage included the debt to total 
assets, times interest earned, and debt service coverage ratios; and finally, profitability included 
the ROA and ROE ratios. After the ratios had been calculated over the ten year period for the 
seventy-six agricultural cooperatives a trend analysis was also performed. The authors used this 
analysis to emphasis how important it is to not rely on only one or two ratios to tell the whole 
story. This article stresses the importance of using many financial ratios to analyze different 
aspects of cooperative performance.  
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2.2.2. Size and Industry Effects in the Performance of Agricultural Cooperatives  
 Lerman and Parliament (1991) evaluated whether size and industry had a significant 
effect on the financial performance of cooperatives. Finding accurate ways to evaluate the 
financial performance of cooperatives has continued to be a topic of interest. However, because 
there haven’t been many advances in methods to fully capture the benefits of cooperatives, this 
research used the four generally accepted financial measures for IOFs. The four measures were 
as follows: leverage, as a debt to equity ratio; efficiency, as an asset turnover ratio; liquidity, as a 
quick ratio; and profitability, as a rate of return on equity ratio, with profit measured before tax. 
The cooperatives were categorized into their respective sizes based on their assets. To account 
for the industry effect the forty-three cooperatives in the sample were separated into four 
categories: dairy, supply, food marketing and processing, and grain and cotton marketing 
cooperatives. The financial ratios were found in the cooperatives’ annual reports from 1970 to 
1987. The researches performed the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test to detect significant 
differences among industry and size categories. Furthermore, linear regression analysis was 
performed to identify trends by size and industry and predict future changes. This study found 
that while large cooperatives may be able to capture economies of scale, efficiency doesn’t 
necessarily translate into higher profitability. Liquidity and profitability were found to be 
significantly higher for smaller cooperatives. The trend analysis showed an increasing trend for 
all categories in the large cooperatives, whereas the small cooperative experienced a decreasing 
trend over time. However, the model was unable to detect significant differences between capital 
structures of the different size cooperatives. This coupled with the trend analysis indicates that 
large cooperatives can be expected to have higher leverage than their smaller counterparts in the 
future. 
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2.2.3. New Risk-Management Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives  
 Zeuli (1999) analyzed the new risk management techniques that were being implemented 
by cooperatives at the time. Zeuli recognized that risk management, while important for all 
agribusinesses, becomes especially crucial in the cooperative sector because of the relationship 
that the cooperative’s income has with the members’ net farm income. A major motivation to 
become a member of a cooperative is typically found to be the cooperative’s ability to manage 
risk, yet some fail to realize that because the members are the ones funding the cooperative they 
are now exposed to these risks at both the farm and cooperative levels. The amount of business 
risk is considered to be mainly composed of price and throughput uncertainty, therefore, this 
paper focuses on ways to mitigate, but not completely eliminate, these uncertainties. If a 
company were to completely eliminate price and throughput uncertainty there would be no 
opportunity for profits so they must balance the amount of business risk that they are able to 
mitigate. The research specifically analyzed ways that cooperatives could use contingent claim 
contracts in the capital market, area yield contracts and weather indexes for throughput risk, and 
segmenting yield risk to further manage the risk of the cooperative. While the research didn’t 
present a model it recognized that if cooperatives were to use any, or a combination, of these risk 
management techniques, it would diminish the profits of the cooperatives. The research 
emphasized that the members must approve the risk management the cooperative provides in 
relation to the potential loss of profits as well.   
2.2.4. Informing Measurement of Cooperative Performance  
 Franken and Cook (2015) took a new approach to analyzing the performance of 
cooperatives. The authors recognized that cooperatives have a dual objective function and 
research that only took the financial performance of cooperatives into consideration may not be 
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the proper approach for analysis as compared with their IOF counterparts. This dual objective 
function would not only consider profitability but also the member benefit objective, which 
should not be discredited when evaluating cooperative performance. Many researchers recognize 
the importance of the member benefits that cooperatives provide but commonly apply readily 
available financial measurements to analyze cooperatives (Franken and Cook, 2015). A reason 
for adopting the readily available financial measurements can partially be attributed to the 
criticisms of cooperatives as inferior organizations by authors such as Furubotn (1976). The 
authors believed there may not be a strong correlation between financial statistics and patron 
members’ satisfaction. Therefore, a survey was added to their analysis in an attempt to capture 
more of the cooperatives’ dual objective. While the members weren’t directly surveyed, the 
board chairs were surveyed which conceptually should capture the members’ satisfaction as they 
are elected by the members to represent them. The study performed a correlation analysis and 
then a confirmatory factor analysis that developed a broader measure of cooperative 
performance, reflecting financial and other aspects of performance.  
 The research attempted to include global performance construct, competitive position, the 
ability to achieve vision and patron satisfaction. The authors found significant relation among 
these various measures in U.S. agricultural cooperatives. The authors also found a relatively 
strong relationship among the alternative performance measures when managers felt that strong 
financial performance was equated with good overall performance. Cooperatives that used cost 
of goods sold accounting measures were found to be more consistent with IOFs and this was 
evidenced by the fact that these cooperatives experienced relatively higher correlations between 
measures of financial performance and other performance measures. The correlations between 
financial and other performance measures led the authors to suggest that depending on the 
 16 
purpose of future research, adding the non-financial measures may not be necessary. The authors 
recognize that other measures may be out there for better measurement of member benefits and 
suggest this as an area for future research.  
2.2.5. Sources of Financial Stress in Agricultural Cooperatives 
 Moller, et al. (1996) analyzed what factors, inadequate profitability, excessive debt or 
high interest rates played the most significant role in causing financial stress for a cooperative. 
The research analyzed local U.S. grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives that were under 
financial stress from the research years of 1987-1992. The research defined financial stress as 
having a negative average rate of return on equity during the defined research years. After 
determining this, the study estimated how much of the ROE was attributable to the return on 
assets, leverage, and interest rates using a regression analysis.  
 As could be expected, the stressed cooperatives that were analyzed for this study were 
found to have a lower ROA, higher leverage, and higher borrowing costs than their non-stressed 
counterparts. The regression found that for the 226 financially stressed cooperatives, on average, 
54.3 percent of the financial stress could be attributed to an ROA problem, 22 percent to leverage 
problems, and 23.8 percent to interest rate problems. The study then analyzed the financially 
stressed cooperatives by size and found that the sources of financial stress were distributed 
differently and the percent of firms financially decreased as size increased. Product mix was also 
taken into consideration and it was found that cooperatives that heavily relied on grain sales 
tended to have a higher percentage of financially stressed cooperatives. For all cooperatives it 
was found that ROA tends to contribute the most to financial stress compared to leverage and 
debt financing.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used for this project. The 
methodology includes stochastic simulation which will be discussed in great detail in the next 
chapter. Comparative statics analysis using coefficients of variance (COVs) and the contributions 
to variation between the inputs and outputs will be analyzed after the model simulations are run. 
This will be done to analyze the research question of whether or not commonly used financial 
performance measure are capturing the effects of financial risk on cooperative performance. The 
hypothesis is that there is not a significant difference in ability to measure financial risk whether 
using the academic literature or the lender ratios. 
The previous chapter reviewed the research on and explanation of business risks faced by 
agricultural businesses. However, financial risk has not been evaluated in as much detail and this 
project aims to make a contribution towards the measurements and effects of financial risk. This 
section will begin with a review of cooperative finance to help the reader gain a greater 
understanding of the unique cooperative finance characteristics that will have an effect on the 
results of this study. The theoretical framework of the model will then be presented.  
3.1. Cooperative Finance Review 
Cooperatives have many unique characteristics that make them different from other 
business models. People join a cooperatives for a variety of reasons and one of them may include 
the financial benefits of being a member of a cooperative. Examples of some financial benefits 
that may entice people to join a cooperative include price differentials, service differentials and 
competitive yardstick effects. However, benefits such as these become difficult to measure for a 
variety of reasons. Therefore, this section will focus on two financial benefits that are reflected 
on the financial statements of the cooperatives - income allocation and equity redemption. This 
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will only provide a brief overview; however, and if the reader is interested in learning more 
about the subject the following resources will be helpful include Cobia (1989), Frederick, et al. 
USDA publication (1997) and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Cooperatives 
website. 
3.1.1. Income Allocation 
When the cooperative has a positive net income for the fiscal year the management has 
several choices regarding the distribution of income. This decision usually begins with whether 
or not to distribute net income as patronage refunds, dividends or unallocated equity. According 
to Cobia (1989), dividends on equity is not commonly used by cooperatives. Therefore, we will 
only discuss how cooperatives use either patronage refunds or unallocated equity.  
If patronage refunds are chosen by the cooperative as the income allocation decision 
further decisions must also be made. These patronage refunds can be either qualified or non-
qualified. The qualified or non-qualified decision is related to the taxation faced by the 
cooperative. If the patronage refunds are qualified, the member then must claim the 
cooperative’s entire income allocation on their taxable income. This is commonly referred to as 
pass through taxation. Once this decision is made the board and management must decide how 
much to retain as equity and how much to give back to the members as cash disbursement. If the 
patronage refunds are qualified, the cooperative is required to pay at least 20% back to the 
member in cash.  
Non-qualified allocations are considered taxable income to the cooperative. The 
cooperative retains this equity within the cooperative and credits the appropriate amount to each 
members’ equity account within the cooperative. Non-qualified allocations have no requirement 
for how much or how little must be paid to the member in cash. However, once the equity from 
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these accounts is paid out to the member, the member must claim the cash allocation as part of 
their own taxable income and the cooperative claims a tax credit. These income allocations are 
normally made proportional to patronage, not equity. 
Cooperatives are not required to allocate their net income back to their members and can 
choose instead to retain it within the cooperative. This is referred to as unallocated equity. 
Unallocated equity is not assigned to any specific member like qualified equity. This type of 
allocation is taxed at the cooperative level because it is not credited to any specific member. 
Cooperatives may choose not to allocate certain types of income such as income from non-
member business, rents, interest earned on various funds and excesses over book value from 
sales of property. Unallocated reserves are seen as a potential reserve against future losses but 
also reduce the realized return of the member (Cobia, 1989).  
3.1.2. Equity Redemption 
The unique structure of a cooperative’s equity means that the cooperative will return a 
member’s allocated equity back to them at some point. There are many challenges in cooperative 
equity redemption because over time some members become overinvested while others become 
underinvested relative to the patronage of other members. While equity redemption is another 
benefit that members receive this is not a requirement for the cooperative. There may be periods 
where the cooperative is unable to redeem equity. The equity redemption plans usually fall into 
two categories, systematic or specialized programs (Cobia, 1989). Systematic programs are plans 
that redeem equity through a recurring processing that keeps equity investment in the hands of 
active members as much as possible. Specialized programs are plans that redeem equity only 
when a special event in the life of the member occurs, such as, a member’s death. There are four 
plans to redeem equity for the cooperative, (1) the revolving fund plan, (2) the base capital plan, 
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(3) the percentage-of-all-equities plan, and (4) the specialized plan. The first three of these plans 
are systematic. Cooperatives may also use combinations of any of these plans. 
The revolving fund plan redeems equity on a first-in, first-out basis. Once the cooperative 
has accumulated a predetermined amount of equity it can begin to redeem old equities to 
members. The amount redeemed will be paid out to the member in accordance with the 
member’s use of the cooperative. The revolving periods range from 18 months to more than 30 
years. Farm supply cooperatives have historically had the longest periods while service 
cooperatives have had the shortest revolvement periods. This plan can also be implemented using 
an age trigger. The member will receive their equity, typically 100 percent, at a certain age.  
The base capital plan attempts to balance the investment of members. This plan 
determines a member’s equity investment annually and is upon their historic patronage. Once the 
target annual investment is determined, under invested members will be required to continue 
investing in the cooperative while the over invested members will receive a partial or full refund 
if the cooperative can provide it. Once a member has invested to their required amount, 
patronage refunds are returned to members in cash. Only under invested members will continue 
to have some of their patronage refunds retained. This type of plan is expensive to implement 
because of the requirement to determine every member’s required investment in the cooperative. 
Another difficulty with this type of plan is that some members, such as new farmers, may have a 
difficult time providing their fair share of equity right away.  
The percentage-of-all-equities plan will retire a percentage of all outstanding equity, 
regardless of issue date. The cooperative reduces the equity investment of every member by the 
same percentage using this plan. This is a good approach for cooperatives with stable 
membership and patronage. The policy is easy to understand and administer and can be readily 
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adjusted based on operating results. It also rewards new patrons by prompt equity redemption but 
also extends the transfer of ownership from overinvested members to currents patrons and 
actually is never transferred until the equity accounts of former members are completely closed 
out.   
A specialized plan requires the cooperative to redeem the equity of a member when a 
special event occurs, such as death, leaving the trade territory, etc. For specialized plans, the 
cooperative accumulates equity until the predefined situation occurs and upon verification will 
redeem the equity either in the full amount or over a number of years. This plan is by far the 
most common but this is thought to be due to extenuating circumstances rather than choice. 
Therefore, this plan is typically used in combination with one of the other plans as well to 
achieve equity redemption (Cobia, 1989).  
3.2. Theoretical Background 
 After completing a model cooperative, this project will perform a stochastic simulation 
analysis on how well the financial ratios capture changes in financial risk faced by a cooperative. 
An econometric analysis will not be used as in previous research because a reasonable amount of 
historical data was not able to be collected for the purposes of this research. The stochastic 
simulation approach is useful as it will allow the project to maintain better control of business 
risk and allow for financial risk to be measured alone. In this project, financial risk is defined as 
the base interest rate, terms of credit and accounts receivable risks. 
 The ratios that will be discussed in the theoretical results will be broken into two 
sections; academic literature ratios and lender ratios. The academic literature ratios include the 
return on equity, return on assets, return on equity minus return on assets, total asset turnover, 
sales to accounts receivable, debt service coverage, current and debt to equity ratios (Lerman and 
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Parliament, 1991; Messina, et al., 1994). The lender ratios include the debt service coverage, 
current, working capital to sales, interest coverage, local return on sales, and long term debt to 
equity ratios. The formal calculations for all these ratios are included in the Appendix A. By 
performing the stochastic simulation this project will test the hypothesis that there is not a 
significant difference in the ability to measure financial risk in traditional agricultural 
cooperatives between ratios found in the academic literature or by lenders.  
3.2.1. Stochastic Simulation using Monte Carlo Simulations 
 The Stochastic Forecasting Model, which will be described in the next chapter, will 
provide an analysis of our model cooperative under financially risky conditions to provide a 
simulation that would be more telling of real world conditions. The stochastic variables will 
include those that will allow the model to add business and financial risk into the model. The 
specific stochastic variables will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. This stochastic 
simulation uses Monte Carlo simulations which pulls random numbers from a defined 
distribution to model risk. After running a simulation model comparative statics analysis will be 
performed by creating alternative conditions to represent a high risk financial environment. The 
project will then look into the contributions to variation between the stochastic simulation inputs 
and the ratio outputs identified to see if these capture the changes in financial risk. Business risk 
will be held constant throughout all of our models to ensure financial risk is being captured and 
business risk isn’t being mistaken to be captured instead. Another reason for leaving business 
risk constant is to prevent the changes in business risk from overshadowing the financial risk and 
provide inaccurate results.   
 This research is especially concerned with the net income (or profit) the cooperative 
makes for its comparative statics comparison because of inconsistencies within the previous 
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literature. The literature has previously defined total risk as the standard deviation of ROE 
(Parliament & Lerman, 1993), the COV in real net farm income (Barry, et al., 2001), and total 
risk is not clearly defined by the other researchers (Gabriel and Baker, 1980; Collins, 1985; 
Barton, et al., 1996; and Cheng and Gloy, 2008). As can be seen from this small sample, there 
isn’t consensus yet on how to properly measure total risk and further problems arise when 
financial and business risk need to be measured separately. This project is going to assume the 
viewpoint of the cooperative management and since cooperatives are not publicly traded and the 
concern is not as much on investment activities the research will look at the variability in net 
income of the cooperative as its total risk because that is what a management team will be most 
concerned with.  
 This project assumes that the cooperative uses the variability of net income, or profit, as 
the measure of total risk; therefore, a profit equation for the firm must be defined:  
(1) 𝜋 = (𝑃 ∗ 𝑄) − 𝑇𝐶 
Where 𝜋 is profit, P is prices, Q is quantity, and TC is total costs. The profit equation is then 
expanded to include enterprise mixes (i) and years (t): 
(2) 𝜋 = (𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡) − (𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝑡) 
Where VC is variable costs and FC is fixed costs. The equation is then expanded again to include 
the distributions that were added into the model to account for the uncertainty of the real world: 
(3) 𝜋 = [(𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝑓(𝑄𝑖𝑡)) + 𝑂𝐼𝑡] − [𝑓(𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡
′ ) + 𝐹𝐶𝑡 +  𝑓(𝐼𝑖𝑡)] 
Where OI is other income, f(x) denotes if a variable is utilizing a stochastic component, and I is 
for the interest expense. The business risk is calculated using a stochastic simulation for the price 
and quantity variables of the model. The financial risk is included in the variable costs and the 
interest expense. The equation is then expanded again to include the stochastic component of the 
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bad debt expense so that the financial risk is separated completely out of the variable costs 
component.  
(4) 𝜋 = [(𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡) ∗ 𝑓(𝑄𝑖𝑡)) + 𝑂𝐼𝑡] − [(𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡
" + 𝐹𝐶𝑡 +  𝑓(𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝑓(𝐵𝐷𝑡)] 
Where BD stands for bad debt expense. After the bad debt expense is separated out from the 
variable costs, there is no longer any stochastic simulation components in the calculation of 
variable costs. The stochastic variable distributions will be explained in more detail in the data 
chapter.  
 Once the profit of the cooperative has been simulated for both cases a comparative statics 
analysis will be performed using the COVs for the ratios in the base case and severe financial 
risk case. Then contributions to variation, which are calculated by analyzing how the stochastic 
simulation variables affect the output variables, will be analyzed. This will help provide analysis 
as to whether or not the literature or lending industry found accurate ways to capture the effects 
financial risk has on a cooperative.  
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4. DATA 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data used to analyze how the financial and 
business risks of the cooperative affect a model cooperative that has been created for the 
purposes of this research. A description of the simulation model used in this research will first be 
presented. Then, a discussion of the data sources used for the creation of the model cooperative. 
The final section of this chapter will discuss the assumptions and stochastic variables used in the 
model cooperative to analyze business and financial risks faced by a cooperative.  
4.1. Stochastic Forecasting Model 
 A general deterministic forecasting simulation model was created by Mr. Edward Janzen 
and Dr. Frayne Olson as a way to create pro forma financial statements for cooperatives. This 
spreadsheet was originally intended for New Generation Cooperatives but this research is 
analyzing risk in traditional cooperatives. Therefore, the model had to be modified for the 
purposes of this study. The model was also changed to include stochastic variables to provide an 
analysis of risk. These stochastic variables will be discussed in detail in the next section. This 
section will explain the inputs required to create the model cooperative used in this research.  
4.1.1. Input Section 
The input section contains all input variables which include past and present values for 
various parameters. The pro forma format of this simulation requires some inputs to either have a 
steady growth rate over the years or an input for every year into the future. These are typically 
allowed to be chosen by the user. The input sheet is broken into the following eight subsections: 
1) General Data 
2) Production / Sales / Price Data 
3) Operating Costs Data 
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4) Investment / Depreciation Data 
5) Sources of Funds (Other than from Operations) 
6) Income Allocation 
7) Initial Balance Sheet Values 
8) Other Management Parameters  
The General Data section includes a section for the name of the cooperative, the products 
the cooperative deals with, the starting year, and the number of months in year one. The product 
lines allows the labels for the units and margins to be changed as well.     
The Production / Sales / Price Data allows data to be entered in one of two ways. The 
data can be entered with a starting amount and a percentage increase that will be added 
uniformly over the years or the data can be entered individually for all years. This section 
includes annual sales volume, price, sales commission, and cost of goods. The sales commission 
is not needed for the purposes of this study so they have all been set to 0%. This section was 
identified as business risk component of the cooperative. It is important to note here that these 
inputs were converted from deterministic variables to allow for stochastic simulation. The 
stochastic nature of these inputs will be discussed in the next section.  
The Operating Costs Data subsection includes a similar format as the previous section. 
Again, numbers can be calculated by annual percentage increase or entered manually for every 
year. The budget costs included in the spreadsheet can be changed for the purposes of 
simulation. This study has included salaries, payroll taxes/benefits, supplies, property taxes, 
repairs and maintenance, utilities and other expenses. These were chosen based on the 
breakdown of expenses from the available financial statements that were used to create the 
model cooperative.  
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The Investment/Depreciation Data subsection includes inputs for beginning values of 
land, land improvements, buildings, and equipment. The equipment is broken down into 
production, packaging, transportation and office. Each of these inputs are allowed to have 
different depreciation schedules. There are also pre-production expenses which includes 
consulting, legal, organizational expense, startup costs, intangible assets and additional 
intangible assets. There is also additional equipment input for all years which must be inputted 
individually. This additional equipment includes tax depreciation and book depreciation life. 
This is because the income statement is calculated on both a tax and book basis and the user may 
decide which is more useful for their research purposes. 
The Sources of Funds subsection contains the funds obtained from sources other than 
operations. The first input is the beginning balances for shareholder equities which include the 
qualified allocations, non-qualified allocations, and unallocated reserves. Next, is the initial 
shareholder equity which includes both membership stock and equity stock with inputs for share 
price at dollars per share and the number of shares. There is a section for new shareholder equity 
which was included in the model for new generation cooperatives. Therefore, this study will 
leave these values as zero because it is only analyzing traditional cooperatives. The next input is 
debt financing, referring to the long-term debt the cooperative takes on. There are inputs for the 
purpose, amount, interest rate, terms, number of payments per year and what year the loan 
becomes available for use. Finally, there is an input for the revolving line of credit that includes 
the initial balance and an interest rate that must be entered individually for all years. The interest 
rates faced by the cooperative were identified to be one of the financial risks that could became a 
stochastic variable for further analysis of its effect on the cooperative. Therefore, it is important 
to note here that the interest rates for the debt financing and revolving line of credit were 
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converted from deterministic to stochastic variables to allow for simulation. The stochastic 
nature of these inputs will be discussed in the next section.  
The Income Allocation subsection allows the type of income allocation the cooperative 
uses to be changed to match that of the desired strategy. The income allocation strategy must be 
entered for every year, therefore, it can allow for different strategies to be used in certain years if 
needed. The first step is to choose the percentage of income allocation that will be designated to 
qualified (cash or retained), non-qualified, and unallocated reserves. Then, the dollar amounts for 
redeemed allocations must be entered for all years. For the purposes of this study, another line 
was added so that a percentage of the income would be redeemed rather than an arbitrary 
number. This was done to reflect the performance of the cooperative in any given year.  
The Initial Balance Sheet Values subsection includes inputs for starting values for several 
variables. Those included are accounts receivable, operating note, accounts payable and 
undistributed deficit. These provide a starting point for variables so that the model cooperative 
can be simulated has one that has been in operation rather than as a cooperative that has just 
started. 
The Other Management Parameters subsection includes components that would affect 
management decisions. The first consideration is whether or not there was a net operating loss to 
be carried forward. The minimum cash balance is inputted as a proxy for the operating note so 
the cooperative will continually maintain this value. There is a section for accounts receivable, 
interest rate for accounts receivable, accounts payable and interest rate on accounts payable. 
Each of these components is broken down into different time periods as well. These are 0 to 30 
days, 31 to 60 days, 61 to 90 days and over 90 days. The accounts receivables over 90 days were 
identified as another one of the financial risks that could be manipulated for further analysis of 
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its effect on the cooperative. Therefore, it is important to note here that the accounts receivable 
section was converted from a deterministic to stochastic variable to allow for simulation of the 
bad debt expense, as a percentage of the accounts receivables over 90 days, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. There is an input for the member marginal tax rate 
for the qualified allocations. The inventory input section includes a beginning inventory, 
inventory buildup and days in inventory section. These inventory inputs are broken down by 
product. The inventory buildup and days in inventory has inputs for every year to allow for 
changes in management decisions.  
4.2. Data Sources 
The financial statements, assumptions and stochastic variables will be discussed in more 
detail in this section. These all contributed to the creation of the model cooperative in different 
ways. The data for this research came from financial statements and discussions with CoBank 
personnel in the Fargo, N.D. regional office. 
4.2.1. Financial Statements 
 The first step in creating the model cooperative was performed by analyzing historical 
data from selected cooperatives in the North Dakota region. The financial statements were 
provided to the Quentin Burdick Center for Cooperatives for research purposes. Cooperatives 
that didn’t have any gaps in their historical data were first identified. Then, traditional 
cooperatives that were agricultural with business units in grain, fertilizer, agronomy and 
petroleum were identified. From this analysis, a total of three traditional agricultural cooperatives 
were chosen to build the model cooperative.  
Averages of historical data from the financial statements that were identified were used 
as the beginning benchmark for what the model cooperative would be based on. After this data 
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was in hand, Preston Kranz, the Regional Vice President of CoBank was contacted to further 
discuss how to make the model more realistic. Mr. Kranz was able to provide valuable input to 
help make the simulation models as realistic as possible.  
4.2.2. Assumptions and Stochastic Variables 
 When creating the model cooperative there were several key assumptions that had to be 
made in order to make the stochastic variables realistic. This was done by using both historical 
data and visiting with Mr. Kranz at CoBank to make the model cooperative as close to realistic 
as possible. The key assumptions that were made in regards to the stochastic variables are 
presented and discussed in the following tables.  
 Table 4.1 presents the business risk component of the model cooperative. The production, 
sales and price data were considered to be business risk because these values are outside of the 
management’s control. While the management may try to minimize the uncertainty of these 
values there is no way to completely eliminate variability. Therefore, these inputs were 
determined to be more valuable to the research if they were to be stochastic in nature rather than 
deterministic. 
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Table 4.1: Production / Sales / Price Input Assumptions 
Category Distribution Min, Most Likely, Max 
Sales Volume 
     Grain (bushels) 
     Fertilizer (tons) 
     Agronomy (% margin) 
     Petroleum (gallons) 
     Misc. Income ($) 
 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
         % change 
(-0.4,0,0.4) 
(-0.3,0,0.3) 
(-0.25,0,0.25) 
(-0.1,0,0.1) 
(-0.1,0,0.1) 
Price 
     Grain (bushels) 
     Fertilizer (tons) 
     Agronomy (% margin) 
     Petroleum (gallons) 
     Misc. Income ($) 
 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
          $ per unit 
(0.05,0.25,0.55) 
(30,50,75) 
(0.05,0.15,0.25) 
(0.15,0.35,0.55) 
         -  
Cost of Goods  
     Grain (bushels) 
     Fertilizer (tons) 
     Agronomy (% margin) 
     Petroleum (gallons) 
     Misc. Income ($) 
 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
Triangular 
         $ per unit margin 
(-0.5,0,0.5) 
(-50,0,50) 
(-0.15,0,0.15) 
(-0.2,0,0.2) 
          - 
 
The assumptions made regarding the sales volume, price and cost of goods sold were all 
based on triangular distributions with different distributions depending on the type of product 
being considered. The distributions found in Table 4.1 will not change from the base case, which 
represents low financial risk, to the severe case, which represents high financial risk, simulations. 
This is because the business risk variables were unchanged throughout both simulation cases to 
try to provide analysis into the effects financial risk had on the cooperative only.  
 The financial risk components were broken into the interest rate and accounts receivable 
portions. The interest rate category was further broken down to include a variability of base 
interest rate that would raise the interest rate a specified amount based on how the cooperative 
scored in regards to certain ratios. The base interest rate was based on the prime interest rates 
found in the lending industry and the credit rating score provides the additional interest rate. This 
additional interest rate premium added to the base interest rate is determined by a credit rating 
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score given to the cooperative based on certain criteria of given ratios. These two categories were 
identified because they could be manipulated by the simulation model to measure different 
aspects of financial risk faced by a cooperative. These categories will be presented and discussed 
in the following tables.  
Table 4.2: Interest Rate Assumptions 
Type of Interest Scenario Distribution % Interest Rate Dist. 
Revolving Credit Base Triangular (0.03,0.04,0.05) 
Revolving Credit Severe Triangular (0.03,0.08,0.13)  
Long Term Debt Base Triangular (0.03,0.04,0.05)  
Long Term Debt Severe Triangular (0.03,0.08,0.13)  
 
 The interest rates that were used in this study for the base case were developed 
considering the current interest rate environment. The triangular distribution was used again to 
prevent values from becoming negative or too large. The severe case was made to be more 
volatile to provide analysis for a riskier interest rate environment similar to conditions during the 
farm financial crisis of the 1980s. The interest rates for the severe case were established because 
interest rates are expected to become more volatile in the coming years. However, the research 
does not expect the interest rates to become as high as was seen in the 1980s. Therefore, the 
interest rates were less volatile than that time period. These numbers were chosen with help from 
CoBank as well. In Table 4.2, the base and severe case have the same interest rate distribution 
for both the revolving credit and long term debt interest rates. Table 4.3 shows the credit rating 
score that determines the additional interest rate premium summed with the base rate the 
cooperative receives. 
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Table 4.3: Credit Rating Scoring 
Ratio Criteria Score 
Local Savings /  
Total Sales 
> 2% 0 
Term Debt /  
Net Fixed Assets 
≤ 0.5 0 
Working Capital /  
Total Sales 
> 4% 0 
Total LT Debt /  
Total Members’ Equity – Regional Investment 
≤ 50% 0 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio > 2 0 
Local Savings + Interest Expense / 
Interest Expense 
≥ 3 0 
Current Assets /  
Current Liabilities 
> 1.5 0 
 
 Following discussions with CoBank, a credit rating scoring system was developed for the 
simulation model. The credit rating score that the cooperative received added a specified 
percentage to the base interest rate that the cooperative received from the lender. This added 
percentage is presented in Table 4.4. Cooperatives, surprisingly, employ an average of less than 
20% of their term loans are fixed interest rates (Kranz, 2017). Therefore, this project assumes 
stochastic variables for all of the interest rates calculations. This distinction is important because 
the annual principal payments change as a result of the stochastic interest rates.  
 To calculate the credit rating, the cooperative was assigned a value of zero or one for 
each ratio. If the cooperative was within the range specified by the literature received from 
CoBank (2017), the cooperative received a score of zero for that ratio. If the cooperative fell 
outside of the satisfactory range it received a score of one. These values were then summed to 
establish the credit score, which was then used to establish the interest premium added to the 
base rate. The interest rates that were based on the credit scoring system increased in an 
exponential fashion and were as follows: 
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Table 4.4: Credit Rating Scoring System  
Score 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 + 0% + 0.50% + 0.75% + 1.00% + 1.50% + 2.50% + 4.00% 
 
 The next component of financial risk that was incorporated into the simulation model 
dealt with the accounts receivable over 90 days, which is presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Accounts Receivable Assumptions 
Type Scenario Distribution Min, Most Likely, Max 
AR over 90 days Base - 1% of total net sales 
 
AR over 90 days Severe - 3% of total net sales 
 
Bad Debt Expense   Base Triangular (0.01,0.02,0.03)  
% of AR in Bad Debts 
Bad Debt Expense Severe Triangular (0.05,0.10,0.15) 
% of AR in Bad Debts 
 
 As can be seen in Table 4.5, the accounts receivable over 90 days was not a stochastic 
variable but it is included in this table because it is connected to the bad debt expense which is a 
stochastic variable. For the base case, 1% of total net sales would be expected to be found in 
accounts receivable over 90 days. From there, a stochastic simulation variable was added to 
estimate the amount of the accounts receivables over 90 days that would be written off by the 
cooperative as a bad debt expense. In the severe case, the cooperative is expected to have 3% of 
total net sales in accounts receivable over 90 days. From there, the volatility of the bad debt 
expense was increased to simulate a riskier financial environment where farmer member may be 
less likely to pay off their accounts receivable over 90 days.  
It is important to remember that the cooperative is an extension of the member’s 
business. Therefore, if the cooperative is facing more difficult times, the farmer member is likely 
also facing difficult times. 
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5. RESULTS 
After performing a simulation with base and severe scenarios with the stochastic 
simulation model the following results were obtained. It is important to note here that five years 
of pro forma financial statements were estimated because the management decisions regarding 
income allocation and equity redemption were held constant regardless of net income. Therefore, 
the focus on the results will be in the third year. The research is not ignoring the results found 
beyond this but to ensure proper analysis is being performed it is more realistic to assume these 
numbers will be indicative of what the research is trying to find. First, coefficient of variation 
(COV) comparative statics analysis will be discussed followed by the contributions to variation 
results and then the conclusions from these results.  
5.1. Comparative Statics Results 
 After the base case and severe case were simulated the COV was calculated for all the 
identified variables. The results tables that will be presented will separate the literature ratios 
from the lender ratios. Those variables that are included in both have been identified. First, 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 will be presented which include the base case and severe case COVs to 
analyze the changes that were found.  
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Table 5.1: Literature Ratio Coefficients of Variation 
BASE CASE 
Variable 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Net Income 0.4620 0.5401 0.7120 0.8513 1.2250 
ROE 0.4404 0.5161 0.6861 0.8260 1.2410 
ROA 0.4595 0.5295 0.6898 0.8217 1.2118 
ROE – ROA 0.4280 0.5079 0.6864 0.8338 1.2714 
TAT 0.0071 0.0595 0.0831 0.1012 0.1165 
DSC* 0.2436 0.2710 0.3026 0.3336 0.3761 
CR* 0.0192 0.0285 0.0401 0.0511 0.0703 
D/E 0.0333 0.0808 0.1039 0.1226 0.1420 
SEVERE CASE 
Net Income 0.7259 0.8795 1.4732 1.7484 5.0002 
ROE 0.7140 0.8732 1.5491 1.9232 11.2377 
ROA 0.7241 0.8723 1.4817 1.7889 6.3925 
ROE - ROA 0.7082 0.8752 1.5977 2.0214 19.0668 
TAT 0.0069 0.0570 0.0795 0.0968 0.1114 
DSC* 0.2857 0.3045 0.3271 0.3521 0.3942 
CR* 0.0206 0.0309 0.0466 0.0619 0.0872 
D/E 0.0417 0.0909 0.1237 0.1559 0.2109 
Notes: Net Income is included in both tables because it is the measure of total risk in this 
project. The ratios that have a * are utilized by both the academic literature and lenders. ROE 
stands for return on equity, ROA stands for return on assets, TAT stands for total asset 
turnover, S/AR stands for sales to accounts receivable, DSC stands for debt service coverage, 
CR stands for current ratio and D/E stands for debt to equity. 
 
 Table 5.1 summarizes the COVs from the academic literature ratios. The COVs became 
increasingly larger over the five year period for both the base and severe cases. This was to be 
expected based on the cumulative effect that the stochastic simulation had on the different 
variables, such as net income, that had risk outputs. The severe case saw a higher started points 
compared to the base case for all of the ratios.  
 It is important to note here that some variables in the severe case have high numbers in 
the last year. The cumulative effect of all the risk factors in the model resulted in a drop in net 
income, especially in year five. This can be explained by the model not allowing for 
management intervention. The management decisions made by the cooperative would be rather 
complicated to model because decisions depend on many factors. Because of the unique business 
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structure and involvement of membership in management decisions, via the board of directors, 
would make it very difficult to model these decisions appropriately. Therefore, certain 
management decisions were built into the model and were not allowed to change. These 
decisions were income allocation decisions and equity redemption strategies. Another reason for 
these jumps is the loan decisions built into the model. The model specified continuous financing 
requirement that was not changed from the base case to the severe case so that the interest rate 
risk was captured rather than the financing decision. There were larger loans taken out in year 
one, three and five. If management decisions had been allowed these wouldn’t have necessarily 
happened as the cooperative would have adjusted financing decisions based on their 
performance. The risk accumulated over the five year period and can be seen as the COVs 
continually increased. These same assumptions are represented in Table 5.2 because the 
variables are generated from the same model, just separated into the literature and lender ratio 
tables to aid presentation of results.    
 Table 5.1. shows ROE and ROA ratios all significantly increase in year three and five 
when the larger loans are taken out. As was expected, the variability of the ratios increased from 
the base case to the severe case for most ratios. However, the total asset turnover ratio decreased 
from the base case to the severe case in all five years. In the severe case the net income, ROE 
and ROA were all at least double the base case values by 2019 and on. The remaining ratios all 
increased from the base case to severe case but not as drastically. 
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Table 5.2: Lender Ratio Coefficients of Variation 
BASE CASE 
Variable 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Net Income 0.4620 0.5401 0.7120 0.8513 1.2250 
DSC* 0.2436 0.2710 0.3026 0.3336 0.3761 
CR* 0.0192 0.0285 0.0401 0.0511 0.0703 
WC/S 0.1897 0.3302 0.2273 0.5000 0.6811 
ICR 0.3803 0.4449 0.5365 0.6602 0.8517 
LROS 0.4511 0.5016 0.6555 0.7909 1.2349 
LTD/E 0.0266 0.0401 0.0542 0.0747 0.1030 
SEVERE CASE 
Net Income 0.7259 0.8795 1.4732 1.7484 5.0002 
DSC* 0.2857 0.3045 0.3271 0.3521 0.3942 
CR* 0.0206 0.0309 0.0466 0.0619 0.0872 
WC/S 0.2486 0.5626 0.4149 2.2767 61.7829 
ICR 0.4662 0.5204 0.6164 0.7497 0.9782 
LROS 0.7188 0.8569 1.5236 1.9187 12.0944 
LTD/E 0.0396 0.0593 0.0831 0.1162 0.1730 
Notes: Net Income is included in both tables as that is the measure of total risk in this research. 
The ratios that have a * are utilized by both the literature and lenders. DSC stands for debt 
service coverage, CR stands for current ratio, WC/S stands for working capital to sales, ICR 
stands for interest coverage ratio, LROS stands for local return on sales and LTD/E stands for 
long term debt to equity. 
 
 Table 5.2. summarizes the model results for the lender based ratios COVs. As was 
expected, the COVs increased steadily over the five year period for both the lender ratio cases as 
well. Again it is important to note the large increase in the final year of analysis for the lender 
ratios as well. The explanation that was provided in the previous section applies to Table 5.2. 
These variables were all calculated from the same simulations but were separated for easier 
readability.  
 The ratios in Table 5.2 all increased from the base case to the severe case of scenario. In 
the severe case net income, working capital to sales and local return on sales were the ratios that 
more than doubled from the base case by 2019 in this set of ratios. The other ratios increased as 
well by varying amounts but never to double the base case amount. Working capital to sales was 
extremely sensitive to the loans taken out in years three and five. These loans were used for 
 39 
capital acquisitions so the large increase in current assets without a significant matching increase 
in current liabilities could contribute to this significant jumps.  
5.2. Contributions to Variation 
 The contributions to variation is an analysis found in @Risk that can be used to see the 
contributions each designated input (stochastic variable) has on the specified @Risk outputs 
using Monte Carlo simulations. The stochastic inputs included the business and financial risk 
components. This analysis tool then ranked each input’s effect on the output being analyzed. The 
complete results for the contributions to variation for every ratio analyzed can be found in 
Appendix B. This type of analysis was chosen because it provides percentage contributions in a 
consistent format across ratios. This section presents the graphs with the sources of financial risk 
and their contributions to the variation in net income. The tables of the contribution to variation 
are included in Appendix B. In every table, the variables are ranked on their contribution to 
variation in order from one to ten. The top ten were only included because the numbers found 
beyond that point had minimal contributions.  
 It is understood that using this type of analysis for a simulation where inputs were 
provided by the researcher requires careful interpretation. It is also understood that this 
cooperative is not a real world cooperative but attempts to represent cooperatives in the region. 
However, this type of analysis is still was useful to show which sources of financial risk 
contributed to the variation in our chosen ratios.  
 The graphs in this section show the contributions to variation from the sources of 
financial risk in a stacked bar graph. The figures are organized in order based on the source of 
the information. The order is academic literature specific ratios, ratios found in academic 
literature and lending industry and finally lending industry specific ratios. Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 
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5.3 are the academic literature specific ratios. The total asset turnover (which is an academic 
literature specific ratio) had no contributions to variation from the sources of financial risk. 
Therefore, a graph was not included for this ratio but the table for this ratio is included in 
Appendix B. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 are the ratios found in both the literature and the lending 
industry. Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 are the ratios that are specific to the lending industry.  
 
Figure 5.1: Return on Equity Contributions to Variation 
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.1 summarizes the contributions to variation for the return on equity. This ratio 
was used by one of the previous academic literature authors. Other authors used ROE – ROA or 
ROE/ROA. As can be seen there is minimal contributions to variation by the sources of financial 
risk in both the base and severe financial risk cases. Less than 4.5% of the variation in this 
financial ratio can be attributed to financial risk sources in 2017 for the severe case. This is the 
largest contribution to variation for ROE from financial risk. The contributions to variation by 
sources of financial risk continues to decline over the next four years. Therefore, it can be seen 
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why previous academic literature had inconclusive findings when using ROE as a measure of 
financial risk or some variant of the ROE. 
 
Figure 5.2: Return on Asset Contributions to Variation 
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.2 shows the ROA contributions to variation by the sources of financial risk. This 
ratio was used by the academic literature as the definition of business risk. There is very little 
difference in the contributions to variation by the sources of financial risk from the ROE to ROA 
ratio. ROA also had less than 4.5% contribution to variation for the severe case in 2017 with 
steady declines for four years until a slight increase in 2021. This makes sense for a ratio that is 
used to capture business risk rather than financial risk.  
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Figure 5.3: Debt to Equity Contributions to Variation  
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 In Table 5.3 the contributions to variation for debt to equity are presented. In the severe 
case for 2018, it is important to note that the base interest rate for 2017 and 2018 were the 
contributors to variation rather than the base interest rate and the additional interest rate for that 
year. This may be because of the compounding nature of the model simulation. The debt to 
equity ratio seems to be the best academic literature specific ratio that captures sources of 
financial risk, coming in at about 6.6% in 2017 for the severe case. In the following figures, it 
will be seen that the other ratios have higher contributions to variation by sources of financial 
risk.  
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Figure 5.4: Debt Service Coverage Ratio Contributions to Variation 
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.4 shows that the debt service coverage ratio has over 10% higher contributions 
to variation than any other ratio discussed so far. The contributions to variation by sources of 
financial risk in 2017 for the service case are about 18.5% with steady decreases over the next 
five years. This is an expected result as the debt service coverage ratio directly measures debt in 
the calculations. This can also be attributed to the stochastic nature of the interest rates on the 
loans. This had a significant impact on the interest rates paid by the cooperative. Again, this is a 
ratio used by both the academic literature and the lenders.  
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Figure 5.5: Current Ratio Contributions to Variation 
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.5. summarizes the results for the contributions to variation for the current ratio. 
The current ratio has a little over 5% contribution to variation by sources of financial risk in the 
severe case for 2017, slightly less than 3.5% in 2018 and nothing the following years. The 
current ratio is similar to the debt to equity ratio in Figure 5.3 in that the severe case has 
contributions to variation by the base interest rate from the current and previous year for 2018. It 
is interesting to see this happen again when current liabilities is used for the ratio calculation. 
The debt to equity uses the total liabilities for its calculation so it may be concluded that the 
current portion of liabilities is affected more by the base interest rate.  
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Figure 5.6: Local Return on Sales Contributions to Variation 
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.6 is the beginning of the lender specific ratios. The local return on sales has 
similar contributions to variation as the ROE and ROA ratios, about 4.6% contribution to 
variation in 2017 for the severe case. This is reasonable as the net income is the numerator in all 
three ratios. However, it is important to note here that the model only analyzed local savings. 
Therefore, a cooperative that had regional savings as well may have different contributions to 
variation as the net income would be different from the local savings. However, this model does 
not have a distinction between regional and local savings.  
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Figure 5.7: Working Capital to Total Sales Contributions to Variation  
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.7 shows a severe case similar to those found in Figures 5.3 (debt to equity ratio) 
and 5.5 (current ratio) in that the severe case has contributions to variation by the base interest 
rate from the current and previous year for 2018. The contribution to variation in 2019 was from 
the base interest rate in 2019 as well. The contributions to variation from sources of financial risk 
for this ratio was similar to that found in the current ratio at about 5.2% for the severe case in 
2017.  
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Figure 5.8: Interest Coverage Ratio Contributions to Variation 
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.8 shows the interest coverage ratio which has a relatively high amount of 
contributions to variation by sources of financial risk. There is almost 20% contribution to 
variation by sources of financial risk in the severe case for 2017. This is the second highest 
contribution of all the ratios. This relatively high contribution to variation is an expected finding 
as it directly measures the interest expense faced by the cooperative. This is also the only ratio to 
have a contribution to variation by a source of financial risk in the third year for the base case. 
The ratio with the highest contribution to variation will be seen in the last ratio analyzed.  
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Figure 5.9: Long Term Debt to Equity Contributions to Variation  
Notes: Base stands for the base interest rate; Add’l Int stands for the additional interest rate 
added due to the risk credit rating of the cooperative; and Bad Debt stands for the bad debt 
assumption given to the cooperative.  
 
 Figure 5.9 shows the ratio that saw the highest amounts of contribution to variation by 
sources of financial risk in the severe case. This goes back to the discussions with CoBank that 
approximately 20% of cooperatives fixed term interest rates are variable. There is a shift to the 
additional interest rate having a higher contribution than the base interest rate with this ratio. In 
2018 and 2019, there is a contribution to variation by the previous year’s additional (or premium) 
interest rate. Please note, these are seen in the bad debt category for years 2018 and 2019 but are 
labeled in the graph. For example, in 2018 there is a 1.49% contribution to variation by the base 
interest rate, a 17.09% contribution to variation from the additional interest rate premium added 
to the base interest rate from 2018 and a 1.62% contribution to variation from the additional 
interest rate premium added to the base interest rate from 2017. This is because the variable 
interest rate causes a recalculation of the principle payments for the cooperative. These changes 
caused the principle payments to go up which is why such a high contribution to variation by the 
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additional interest rate is seen for this ratio.  A similar situation is seen in 2019 and in 2020 we 
only see a contribution to variation from the additional interest rate premium from that year.  
5.3. Conclusions 
 This chapter began with the COVs to show that there was a difference in the risk from the 
base case to the severe case. Once it was established that the changes in financial risk were being 
captured it was reasonable to then look at the contributions to variation in net income caused by 
the different sources of financial risk. As was seen the ROE and ROA ratios were very similar 
with no differences or differences of under 0.05% were found. This shows that using ROA in any 
capacity, as has been done by academic literature, as a measure of financial risk is unreasonable 
and may have contributed to inconclusive findings in the previous literature. The last academic 
literature specific ratio showed an increase of about 2.5% over the ROE and ROA contributions 
to variation but was still only around 7%. Therefore, it can not be suggested that these academic 
literature ratios should be used for analysis of financial risk for future research.  
 The lender specific ratios show rather significant increases in the contributions to 
variation, specifically in the interest coverage ratio at about 20% and the long term debt to equity 
with over 35%. The lender ratios have the second two highest contributions to variation and the 
third highest is found by a shared ratio with the academic literature, the debt service coverage 
ratio. While the lender ratios do a significantly better job of capturing the variability in the 
sources of financial risk, there was still the local return on sales that had small contributions to 
variation. The other shared ratio with the academic literature, the current ratio, had only about 
5.2% contribution to variation. Therefore, lenders may need to reconsider how they are 
measuring the riskiness of a cooperative when they are deciding how much interest to add to the 
base rate.   
 50 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide conclusions to the project. This chapter will 
restate the purpose of the study as well as the research objectives. Then, a summary of the 
methodology will be presented. Finally, results will be discussed as well as the conclusions that 
came with them.  
6.1. Summary of the Project 
6.1.1. Purpose of the Project 
 The purpose of this study was to contribute to the ability of cooperative management 
teams to understand and measure financial risk faced by the cooperative. This was necessary to 
do as it has not been clearly defined in the past. If businesses expect to do a good job of 
managing risk, it is important to first be able to define that risk and then measure it. If these two 
things can’t be done, it would become extremely difficult to manage the risk. While financial 
risk has not been a major concern to those seeking financing options in today’s environment it is 
expected to become more of a concern in the coming years. It is better to prepare for financial 
risk management in times where there is not as much financial stress rather than wait to create a 
plan when things have gotten bad.  
6.1.2. Objective of the Project 
 There were three main objectives in this project regarding financial risk. First, the project 
had to more accurately define the components of financial risk. Financial risk was defined as 
base interest risk, additional interest determined by a credit rating score and bad debt. Once the 
variables that contribute to financial risk were defined the ratios used in previous literature and 
by agribusiness lenders were analyzed to determine if they captured these changes in financial 
risk by using coefficients of variation. Finally, the contributions to variation were analyzed to 
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compare ratios used by academic literature and agribusiness lenders. These analyses were used to 
determine if there was a significant difference in ability between literature and lender ratios 
measuring financial risk. 
6.1.3. Methodology of the Project 
 The data used in this research project was generated using a stochastic simulation model 
that created pro forma financial statements for a model cooperative facing two different financial 
risk scenarios. The methodology was used by incorporating financial and business risk into an 
Excel based model which used the @Risk add-in for the Monte Carlo simulation. The business 
risk of the cooperative was modeled by adding distributions to the sales volume, price and cost 
of goods sold components of the model. The financial risk in this project was defined as the base 
interest rate, credit rating and bad debt. These were modeled with the base interest rates for both 
the revolving line of credit and long-term debt, the credit rating was included by a credit rating 
score that added an additional interest rate to the base interest rate and a bad debt expense was 
included as a component of the accounts receivable over 90 days. The project then analyzed the 
coefficients of variation and the contributions to variations of the specified ratios used by 
previous literature and agribusiness lenders. The model controlled the ability to measure the 
contributions of financial risk by holding business risk constant. This was done to increase the 
ability to analyze which sources of financial risk were being captured without having business 
risk overshadow the effects of the changes in financial risk from the base case to the severe case. 
This methodology enabled the testing of whether or not commonly used financial performance 
measures are capturing the effects of financial risk on cooperative performance. 
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6.2. Conclusions 
 Business risk has been a widely discussed topic within academic literature and has been 
defined by many authors. The results from this study confirmed that business risk is an important 
attribute to be studied. However, financial risk has not received as much attention and has 
discrepancies in how it is defined and measured. While researchers have not focused on this in 
the past, it may not be as easy to overlook in the future. The potential for increasing interest rates 
in the future requires lenders, agribusinesses and farmers alike to be prepared for such changes 
before they occur. The contributions of this project aims to help those involved understand and 
measure financial risk so they may be prepared for future changes in the financial risk 
environment. While this project doesn’t provide all the answers, it’s objectives to make progress 
on the subject was attained.  
 It was interesting to note that bad debt was only captured in the first year for any of the 
ratios. This shows an area where improvements could be made for ratios used by lenders and 
academic literature. Academic literature may consider looking to the lender literature when 
deciding how to measure financial risk in the future. However, it will be important to also 
incorporate some ratio that has a more accurate measure of bad debt expenses. Also, the fact that 
ROE and ROA had extremely similar results for their contributions to variation shows that using 
ROE – ROA, ROE/ROA or ROE for measures of financial risk would not reasonably be 
capturing all financial risks. This may have been a contributing factor to previous research 
having inconclusive findings.  
 Based on the contributions to variation there are important differences between the ability 
of ratios found within the academic literature and those used by lenders to measure financial risk. 
The literature ratios were impacted less by the financial risk measures than were the lender 
 53 
ratios. The highest contribution by a literature specific ratio was 5.27% for the debt to equity 
ratio. It is also interesting to note how small of an effect the financial risk measures impact the 
variation of ROE because this has typically been used as a financial risk measure in the past by 
literature. There was also one literature specific ratio that didn’t capture any components of 
financial risk. Whereas, the lender specific ratios had contributions from financial risk for every 
ratio. Those contributions ranged from 3.63% for the interest coverage ratio up to 33.41% with 
the long term debt to equity ratio. However, this isn’t to say that the lender ratios do a perfect job 
and future research can continue to improve upon how financial risks are defined and measured.  
 So, as was seen in Chapter 5, the lender ratios were able to better capture sources of 
financial risk in their ratios. Two of the lender specific ratios, interest coverage ratio and long 
term debt to equity, were in the top three for contributions to variation and ratio with the second 
largest contribution to variation was found in the debt service coverage ratio was used by the 
lenders and academic literature.  
6.3. Suggestions for Further Research 
 Future research should begin by attempting to more accurately define sources of financial 
risk. To be able to measure something it is important that it is first defined. While this research 
attempts to make progress at defining the sources of financial risk, it is understood that these 
may not include all sources of financial risk faced by cooperatives. However, the findings of this 
research can help researchers better expand and define sources of financial risk as well as refine 
their measurements.  
This research project not only assists the academic literature but the lenders as well. The 
lenders can use these finding to decide whether or not to refine their ratio analysis for credit 
rating scores. The research project may help lenders decide if they are capturing what they intend 
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to when assessing the riskiness of a certain cooperative. Future research could assist in refining 
these credit rating score ratios in the future.  
A simulation model was a useful starting point to analyze financial risk measures within 
cooperatives. However, if the data could be obtained, future research could analyze how 
financial risks were measured in cooperatives that survived the farm financial crisis and how 
financial risks have continued to be captured past that crisis. Further studies could be conducted 
to find ratios that are able to capture all of the defined financial risks.  
 Future research should attempt to focus on the ability to measure the probability of bad 
debt as this can have a large negative effect on the ability of the cooperative’s operations. More 
precise definitions of financial risk would still be useful as there may be some sources of 
financial risk that this project failed to identify. Empirically testing the lender ratios on historical 
data could provide a better answer to the question posed in this project. 
 If the model is used again for future research it may be useful to analyze how sources of 
financial risk affect the cooperative when simulated as multivariate variables. It would also be 
interesting to see how a cooperative with regional savings would compare with a cooperative 
with only local savings.  
 Once a more accurate measure of financial risk is found it would be helpful for future 
researchers to empirically test the risk balancing hypothesis with this better defined measure. 
This may help to find conclusive results in regards to the risk balancing hypothesis and 
cooperatives.    
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APPENDIX A: FINANCIAL RATIO CALCULATIONS 
Table A.1: Ratio Calculations 
Ratio Calculation 
Return on Assets Net Income /  
Total Assets 
Return on Equity  Net Income /  
Net Worth 
Debt to Equity  Total Liabilities /  
Total Equity 
Total Asset Turnover Sales /  
Total Assets 
Local Return on Sales Local Savings /  
Total Sales 
Working Capital to Sales Working Capital /  
Total Sales 
Long-Term Debt to Equity Ratio Total Long Term Debt /  
(Total Members’ Equity – Regional Investment) 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (Net Savings + Interest + Depreciation) /  
(Term Loan Payments + Interest) 
Interest Coverage Ratio (Local Savings + Interest Expense) /  
Interest Expense 
Current Ratio Current Assets /  
Current Liabilities 
 
 
  
 58 
APPENDIX B: CONTRIBUTION TO VARIATION TABLES 
Table B.1: Return on Equity Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 81.88 G $ ‘18 66.53 G $ ‘19 58.68 G $ ‘20 49.57 G $ ‘21 43.68 
A $ ‘17 9.32 G SV ‘18 13.10 G SV‘19 10.47 G SV ‘20 10.07 G SV‘21 8.63 
F $ ‘17 5.34 A $ ‘18 7.58 G SV‘18 9.08 G SV ‘19 8.23 G SV ‘20 7.89 
P $ ‘17 3.19 F $ ‘18 4.45 A $ ‘19 6.37 G SV‘18 8.10 G SV ‘18 7.58 
C  ‘17 0.15 P $ ‘18 2.58 F $ ‘19 3.65 A $ ‘20 5.84 G SV ‘19 7.54 
B ‘17 0.03 F SV ‘18 1.99 P $ ‘19 2.22 F $ ‘20 3.50 A $ ‘21 5.13 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 1.09 F SV ‘19 1.63 P $ ‘20 1.89 F $ ‘21 2.97 
B ‘17 0.00 M SV ‘18 0.81 F SV ‘18 1.63 F SV ‘20 1.65 P $ ‘21 1.70 
BD ‘17 0.00 C  ‘18 0.06 A SV‘19 0.96 F SV ‘19 1.49 F SV ‘19 1.35 
B ‘17 0.00 G $ ‘17 0.06 A SV‘18 0.80 F SV ‘18 1.31 F SV ‘21 1.29 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 78.38 G $ ‘18 65.39 G $ ‘19 58.39 G $ ‘20 50.21 G $ ‘21 42.51 
A $ ‘17 8.87 G SV ‘18 11.47 G SV‘19 9.19 G SV ‘20 8.99 G SV ‘21 7.50 
F $ ‘17 5.16 A $ ‘18 7.41 G SV‘18 7.36 G SV ‘18 6.90 G SV ‘18 7.27 
C  ‘17 3.56 F $ ‘18 4.42 A $ ‘19 6.53 G SV ‘19 6.77 G SV ‘19 6.79 
P $ ‘17 2.98 C  ‘18 2.54 F $ ‘19 3.58 A $ ‘20 5.97 G SV‘20 6.30 
B ‘17 0.68 P $ ‘18 2.53 C  ‘19 2.41 F $ ‘20 3.68 A $ ‘21 5.14 
BD ‘17 0.22 F SV‘18 1.86 P $ ‘19 2.23 P $ ‘20 2.01 F $ ‘21 3.07 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV‘18 1.06 F SV ‘18 1.62 F SV ‘20 1.61 C  ‘21 1.82 
B ‘17 0.00 M SV ‘18 0.81 F SV ‘19 1.60 C  ‘20 1.59 P $ ‘21 1.79 
B ‘17 0.00 B ‘18 0.42 A SV‘19 0.92 F SV‘19 1.50 F SV‘19 1.55 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.2: Return on Assets Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 82.16 G $ ‘18 68.64 G $ ‘19 61.56 G $ ‘20 52.40 G $ ‘21 45.65 
A $ ‘17 9.19 G SV ‘18 11.15 G SV‘19 9.47 G SV‘20 9.22 G SV ‘21 8.20 
F $ ‘17 5.30 A $ ‘18 7.68 G SV‘18 7.16 G SV‘18 7.12 G SV ‘18 7.42 
P $ ‘17 3.18 F $ ‘18 4.53 A $ ‘19 6.62 G SV‘19 6.94 G SV ‘19 6.98 
C  ‘17 0.15 P $ ‘18 2.62 F $ ‘19 3.81 A $ ‘20 6.05 G SV‘20 6.80 
B ‘17 0.03 F SV ‘18 1.84 P $ ‘19 2.31 F $ ‘20 3.72 A $ ‘21 5.29 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 0.97 F SV ‘18 1.58 P $ ‘20 1.97 F $ ‘21 3.12 
B ‘17 0.00 M SV‘18 0.85 F SV ‘19 1.57 F SV‘20 1.61 P $ ‘21 1.72 
BD ‘17 0.00 C  ‘18 0.06 A SV‘19 0.89 F SV‘19 1.44 F SV ‘19 1.40 
B ‘17 0.00 P SV‘18 0.02 M SV‘18 0.78 F SV‘18 1.38 F SV ‘18 1.34 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 78.69 G $ ‘18 66.59 G $ ‘19 59.82 G $ ‘20 51.68 G $ ‘21 44.43 
A $ ‘17 8.75 G SV ‘18 10.45 G SV‘19 8.96 G SV‘20 8.82 G SV ‘21 7.94 
F $ ‘17 5.12 A $ ‘18 7.41 G SV‘18 6.66 G SV‘18 6.71 G SV ‘18 7.25 
C  ‘17 3.57 F $ ‘18 4.43 A $ ‘19 6.53 G SV‘19 6.31 G SV ‘19 6.80 
P $ ‘17 2.97 P $ ‘18 2.58 F $ ‘19 3.63 A $ ‘20 6.01 G SV ‘20 6.37 
B ‘17 0.68 C  ‘18 2.54 C ‘19 2.38 F $ ‘20 3.73 A $ ‘21 5.12 
BD ‘17 0.22 F SV ‘18 1.76 P $ ‘19 2.23 P $ ‘20 1.99 F $ ‘21 3.09 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 0.98 F SV ‘18 1.59 F SV‘20 1.60 C ‘21 1.77 
B ‘17 0.00 M SV ‘18 0.82 F SV ‘19 1.55 C  ‘20 1.56 P $ ‘21 1.71 
B ‘17 0.00 B ‘18 0.42 A SV‘19 0.87 F SV‘19 1.44 F SV ‘19 1.47 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.3: Debt to Equity Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 84.60 G SV‘18 45.17 G SV‘19 26.40 G SV ‘20 20.04 G SV ‘21 13.37 
A $ ‘17 6.23 G $ ‘17 23.00 G $ ‘18 15.46 G $ ‘19 11.24 G $ ‘21 9.57 
F $ ‘17 4.93 G $ ‘18 14.84 G SV‘18 13.78 G $ ‘18 10.56 G $ ‘20 9.54 
P $ ‘17 3.21 G M‘18 4.41 G $ ‘17 13.52 G $ ‘17 9.83 G $ ‘18 8.68 
C  ‘17 0.24 A $ ‘17 2.64 G $ ‘19 9.81 G SV ‘19 9.74 G $ ‘19 8.64 
B ‘17 0.05 F $ ‘17 1.37 G M‘18 2.99 G $ ‘20 8.48 G $ ‘17 7.63 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 1.35 G M‘19 2.63 G SV ‘18 3.17 G SV ‘20 5.20 
B ‘17 0.00 A $ ‘18 1.18 A $ ‘18 1.73 G M ‘19 2.28 M SV‘18 2.23 
BD ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘17 0.88 A $ ‘17 1.67 G M ‘20 2.15 G M ‘19 1.80 
B ‘17 0.00 F $ ‘18 0.85 F $ ‘18 0.89 G M ‘18 2.10 G M ‘18 1.64 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 68.61 G SV ‘18 34.69 G $ ‘19 16.25 G $ ‘19 14.50 G $ ‘21 11.72 
A $ ‘17 6.24 G $ ‘17 22.91 G $ ‘18 16.03 G $ ‘20 12.47 G $ ‘20 10.28 
C  ‘17 5.27 G $ ‘18 17.79 G SV‘19 15.41 G $ ‘18 11.14 G $ ‘19 9.46 
F $ ‘17 4.62 G M‘18 3.67 G $ ‘17 12.93 G $ ‘17 9.07 G $ ‘18 7.27 
P $ ‘17 2.79 A $ ‘17 2.61 G SV‘18 7.27 G SV ‘20 8.03 G $ ‘17 5.96 
B ‘17 1.05 A $ ‘18 1.82 G M ‘18 2.38 G SV ‘19 3.48 G SV ‘21 3.14 
BD ‘17 0.37 F $ ‘17 1.38 A $ ‘19 2.06 A $ ‘19 2.16 M SV‘18 2.54 
B ‘17 0.01 F $ ‘18 1.33 G M‘19 1.98 M SV‘18 2.01 F SV ‘18 2.12 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘17 1.26 A $ ‘18 1.84 G M‘19 1.56 A $ ‘21 1.55 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘18 1.15 A $ ‘17 1.65 G M‘18 1.48 A $ ‘20 1.49 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.4: Total Asset Turnover Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 91.05 G SV‘18 90.84 G SV ‘18 45.80 G SV ‘20 30.97 G SV ‘21 23.44 
F $ ‘17 3.90 G M‘18 4.98 G SV ‘19 45.14 G SV ‘18 29.94 G SV ‘20 22.91 
P $ ‘17 3.05 F SV ‘18 1.59 G M‘19 2.63 G SV ‘19 29.84 G SV ‘18 22.38 
A $ ‘17 2.00 G $ ‘18 1.33 G M‘18 2.53 G M‘19 1.81 G SV ‘19 21.98 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV‘18 0.25 F SV ‘19 0.80 G M‘20 1.70 G M‘19 1.30 
C ‘17 0.00 F M‘18 0.25 F SV ‘18 0.79 G M‘18 1.65 G M‘18 1.24 
B ‘17 0.00 P SV ‘18 0.12 G $ ‘19 0.68 F SV ‘20 0.56 G M‘20 1.23 
BD ‘17 0.00 M SV‘18 0.09 F M‘19 0.15 F SV ‘19 0.55 G M‘21 1.21 
B ‘17 0.00 A M‘18 0.06 A SV ‘18 0.14 F SV ‘18 0.54 F SV ‘20 0.43 
B ‘17 0.00 F $ ‘18 0.05 A SV ‘19 0.12 G $ ‘20 0.42 F SV ‘18 0.40 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 91.05 G SV‘18 90.82 G SV ‘18 45.81 G SV ‘20 30.99 G SV ‘21 23.45 
F $ ‘17 3.90 G M‘18 4.97 G SV ‘19 45.14 G SV ‘18 29.96 G SV ‘20 22.93 
P $ ‘17 3.05 F SV ‘18 1.59 G M‘19 2.63 G SV ‘19 29.84 G SV ‘18 22.41 
A $ ‘17 2.00 G $ ‘18 1.32 G M‘18 2.53 G M‘19 1.81 G SV ‘19 21.99 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV‘18 0.25 F SV ‘19 0.80 G M‘20 1.70 G M‘19 1.30 
C  ‘17 0.00 F M‘18 0.25 F SV ‘18 0.79 G M‘18 1.65 G M‘18 1.24 
B ‘17 0.00 P SV ‘18 0.12 G $ ‘19 0.67 F SV ‘20 0.57 G M‘20 1.23 
BD ‘17 0.00 M SV‘18 0.09 F M‘19 0.15 F SV ‘19 0.55 G M‘21 1.21 
B ‘17 0.00 A M‘18 0.06 A SV ‘18 0.14 F SV ‘18 0.54 F SV ‘20 0.43 
B ‘17 0.00 F $ ‘18 0.05 A SV ‘19 0.12 G $ ‘20 0.42 F SV ‘18 0.40 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the 
Margin distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands 
for Grain, B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the 
credit rating score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.5: Debt Service Coverage Ratio Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 80.62 G $ ‘18 65.62 G $ ‘19 58.13 G $ ‘20 48.29 G $ ‘21 41.90 
A $ ‘17 9.02 G SV ‘18 12.80 G SV ‘19 10.52 G SV ‘20 9.79 G SV ‘18 8.62 
F $ ‘17 5.23 A $ ‘18 7.36 G SV ‘18 8.87 G SV ‘18 8.58 G SV ‘21 8.31 
P $ ‘17 3.13 F $ ‘18 4.37 A $ ‘19 6.18 G SV ‘19 8.10 G SV ‘19 7.84 
C  ‘17 1.77 P $ ‘18 2.45 F $ ‘19 3.53 A $ ‘20 5.44 G SV ‘20 7.42 
B ‘17 0.12 F SV ‘18 1.95 P $ ‘19 2.11 F $ ‘20 3.37 A $ ‘21 4.70 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 1.09 F SV ‘18 1.67 P $ ‘20 1.78 F $ ‘21 2.74 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘18 0.90 F SV ‘19 1.60 F SV ‘20 1.55 P $ ‘21 1.47 
BD ‘17 0.00 M SV‘18 0.81 A SV ‘19 0.94 F SV ‘19 1.48 F SV ‘19 1.44 
B ‘17 0.00 G $ ‘17 0.30 A SV ‘18 0.76 F SV ‘18 1.44 F SV ‘18 1.34 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 65.80 G $ ‘18 56.95 G $ ‘19 55.54 G $ ‘20 48.12 G $ ‘21 42.53 
C  ‘17 17.07 C  ‘18 11.87 G SV ‘19 9.03 G SV ‘20 8.77 G SV ‘21 7.84 
A $ ‘17 7.28 G SV ‘18 10.31 G SV ‘18 6.64 G SV ‘18 6.75 G SV ‘18 7.11 
F $ ‘17 4.28 A $ ‘18 6.41 C  ‘19 5.95 G SV ‘19 6.09 G SV ‘19 6.55 
P $ ‘17 2.50 F $ ‘18 3.82 A $ ‘19 5.89 A $ ‘20 5.52 G SV ‘20 5.99 
B ‘17 1.29 P $ ‘18 2.13 F $ ‘19 3.39 C  ‘20 4.29 A $ ‘21 4.75 
BD ‘17 0.18 F SV ‘18 1.63 P $ ‘19 2.01 F $ ‘20 3.42 C  ‘21 3.08 
B ‘17 0.00 G $ ‘17 0.92 F SV ‘18 1.52 P $ ‘20 1.78 F $ ‘21 2.87 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 0.89 F SV ‘19 1.46 F SV ‘20 1.49 P $ ‘21 1.52 
B ‘17 0.00 B ‘18 0.79 A SV ‘19 0.85 F SV ‘19 1.37 F SV ‘19 1.43 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.6: Current Ratio Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 82.41 G $ ‘17 40.99 G $ ‘18 25.18 G $ ‘20 15.26 G SV‘18 14.54 
A $ ‘17 8.66 G $ ‘18 38.84 G $ ‘17 24.43 G $ ‘19 14.96 G $ ‘21 11.08 
F $ ‘17 5.24 A $ ‘17 4.46 G $ ‘19 23.68 G $ ‘18 14.14 G $ ‘19 8.98 
P $ ‘17 3.24 A $ ‘18 4.33 A $ ‘18 2.99 G $ ‘17 13.53 G $ ‘20 8.78 
C  ‘17 0.16 F $ ‘18 2.55 A $ ‘17 2.78 G SV‘18 11.18 G $ ‘18 8.24 
B ‘17 0.09 F $ ‘17 2.53 A $ ‘19 2.50 G SV‘19 3.23 G $ ‘17 7.66 
B ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘17 1.58 F $ ‘19 1.61 F SV ‘18 3.04 G SV‘19 7.15 
B ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘18 1.55 F $ ‘17 1.58 M SV‘18 1.93 F SV ‘18 3.88 
BD ‘17 0.00 MSV‘18 0.50 F $ ‘18 1.56 A $ ‘20 1.92 G SV‘20 2.33 
B ‘17 0.00 F SV‘18 0.44 M SV‘18 1.38 A $ ‘19 1.75 M SV‘18 2.11 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 73.57 G $ ‘18 37.96 G $ ‘19 27.47 G $ ‘20 15.75 G SV‘18 14 
A $ ‘17 8.48 G $ ‘17 33.28 G $ ‘18 19.73 G $ ‘19 13.69 G $ ‘21 11.39 
F $ ‘17 5.07 A $ ‘18 4.69 G $ ‘17 17.79 G SV ‘18 11.05 G SV‘19 9.33 
C  ‘17 3.93 A $ ‘17 3.59 A $ ‘19 3.53 G $ ‘18 10.67 G $ ‘20 7.93 
P $ ‘17 3.10 F $ ‘18 2.71 G SV‘18 2.68 G $ ‘17 9.37 G $ ‘19 7.43 
B ‘17 0.99 F $ ‘17 2.18 A $ ‘18 2.29 G SV‘19 5.29 G $ ‘18 5.61 
BD ‘17 0.26 P $ ‘18 1.78 A $ ‘17 2.12 F SV ‘18 3.16 G $ ‘17 5.04 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘18 1.74 F $ ‘19 1.96 A $ ‘20 2.16 G SV‘20 4.92 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘17 1.66 F SV ‘18 1.70 M SV‘18 1.98 F SV ‘18 3.57 
B ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘17 1.40 M SV‘18 1.49 A $ ‘19 1.74 F SV ‘19 2.37 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.7: Local Return on Sales Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 82.00 G $ ‘18 74.61 G $ ‘19 67.72 G $ ‘20 58.36 G $ ‘21 49.22 
A $ ‘17 9.28 A $ ‘18 8.74 A $ ‘19 7.59 A $ ‘20 7.24 A $ ‘21 6.70 
F $ ‘17 5.32 F $ ‘18 4.98 G SV ‘19 4.67 G SV ‘20 5.52 G SV ‘18 5.94 
P $ ‘17 3.18 G SV ‘18 4.09 F $ ‘19 4.41 G SV ‘18 4.80 G SV ‘21 5.78 
C  ‘17 0.15 P $ ‘18 2.97 G SV ‘18 4.26 G SV ‘19 4.64 G SV ‘19 5.53 
B ‘17 0.03 F SV ‘18 1.55 P $ ‘19 2.70 F $ ‘20 4.40 G SV ‘20 5.50 
B ‘17 0.00 M SV ‘18 0.94 F SV ‘18 1.57 P $ ‘20 2.32 F $ ‘21 3.72 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 0.85 F SV ‘19 1.48 F SV ‘19 1.58 P $ ‘21 2.05 
BD ‘17 0.00 G M‘18 0.22 M SV ‘18 0.89 F SV ‘20 1.54 F SV ‘18 1.51 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘18 0.07 A SV ‘19 0.85 F SV ‘18 1.52 F SV ‘19 1.51 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 78.47 G $ ‘18 69.83 G $ ‘19 62.00 G $ ‘20 53.51 G $ ‘21 43.55 
A $ ‘17 8.80 A $ ‘18 8.12 A $ ‘19 6.98 G SV ‘20 7.34 G SV ‘21 7.70 
F $ ‘17 5.13 G SV ‘18 6.18 G SV ‘19 6.93 A $ ‘20 6.77 G SV ‘18 7.29 
C  ‘17 3.67 F $ ‘18 4.77 G SV ‘18 5.60 G SV ‘18 5.82 G SV ‘19 6.85 
P $ ‘17 2.97 P $ ‘18 2.82 F $ ‘19 3.94 G SV ‘19 5.48 G SV ‘20 6.36 
B ‘17 0.70 C  ‘18 2.80 C  ‘19 2.63 F $ ‘20 4.08 A $ ‘21 5.43 
BD ‘17 0.23 F SV ‘18 1.63 P $ ‘19 2.45 P $ ‘20 2.16 F $ ‘21 3.34 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 0.94 F SV ‘18 1.63 C ‘20 1.66 P $ ‘21 1.84 
B ‘17 0.00 M SV ‘18 0.88 F SV ‘19 1.57 F SV ‘20 1.62 C ‘21 1.84 
B ‘17 0.00 B ‘18 0.44 M SV ‘18 0.91 F SV ‘19 1.56 F SV ‘19 1.54 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.8: Interest Coverage Ratio Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 78.27 G $ ‘18 64.04 G $ ‘19 57.75 G $ ‘20 47.74 G $ ‘21 41.56 
A $ ‘17 8.71 G SV ‘18 12.28 G SV ‘19 10.31 G SV ‘20 9.49 G SV ‘18 8.39 
F $ ‘17 5.11 A $ ‘18 7.19 G SV ‘18 7.76 G SV ‘18 8.02 G SV ‘21 8.18 
C  ‘17 3.63 F $ ‘18 4.32 A $ ‘19 6.18 G SV ‘19 6.98 G SV ‘19 7.40 
P $ ‘17 2.99 P $ ‘18 2.36 F $ ‘19 3.51 A $ ‘20 5.38 G SV ‘20 6.63 
B ‘17 0.68 F SV ‘18 1.93 P $ ‘19 2.06 F $ ‘20 3.40 A $ ‘21 4.69 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘18 1.85 F SV ‘19 1.63 P $ ‘20 1.76 F $ ‘21 2.79 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 1.07 F SV ‘18 1.63 F SV ‘20 1.52 F SV ‘19 1.48 
BD ‘17 0.00 M SV ‘18 0.80 C  ‘19 0.98 F SV ‘18 1.47 P $ ‘21 1.44 
B ‘17 0.00 G $ ‘17 0.66 A SV ‘19 0.94 F SV ‘19 1.47 F SV ‘18 1.37 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 61.87 G $ ‘18 55.22 G $ ‘19 53.35 G $ ‘20 46.31 G $ ‘21 41.43 
C  ‘17 16.53 C  ‘18 10.68 G SV ‘19 8.67 G SV ‘20 8.50 G SV ‘21 7.70 
A $ ‘17 6.80 G SV ‘18 10.03 G SV ‘18 6.57 G SV ‘18 6.77 G SV ‘18 7.07 
F $ ‘17 4.09 A $ ‘18 6.21 C  ‘19 6.10 G SV ‘19 6.06 G SV ‘19 6.53 
B ‘17 3.19 F $ ‘18 3.76 A $ ‘19 5.67 A $ ‘20 5.35 G SV ‘20 6.02 
P $ ‘17 2.47 P $ ‘18 2.01 F $ ‘19 3.29 C  ‘20 4.33 A $ ‘21 4.68 
BD ‘17 0.17 B ‘18 1.86 P $ ‘19 1.90 F $ ‘20 3.36 F $ ‘21 2.86 
B ‘17 0.00 F SV ‘18 1.60 F SV ‘18 1.51 P $ ‘20 1.74 C  ‘21 2.62 
B ‘17 0.00 G $ ‘17 0.97 F SV ‘19 1.43 F SV ‘20 1.43 P $ ‘21 1.47 
B ‘17 0.00 A SV ‘18 0.85 A SV ‘19 0.85 F SV ‘19 1.35 F SV ‘19 1.40 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.9: Working Capital to Total Sales Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 81.43 G $ ‘17 41.21 G $ ‘18 24.24 G $ ‘20 15.06 G SV‘18 12.24 
A $ ‘17 9.35 G $ ‘18 37.91 G $ ‘17 23.54 G $ ‘19 14.77 G $ ‘21 10.74 
F $ ‘17 5.37 A $ ‘18 4.61 G $ ‘19 21.82 G $ ‘18 14.01 G $ ‘20 8.45 
P $ ‘17 3.25 A $ ‘17 4.51 G SV‘19 4.35 G $ ‘17 13.58 G $ ‘19 8.27 
C  ‘17 0.17 F $ ‘18 2.61 A $ ‘18 2.91 G SV ‘18 8.58 G $ ‘18 7.74 
B ‘17 0.09 F $ ‘17 2.58 A $ ‘17 2.81 F SV ‘18 3.16 G $ ‘17 7.27 
B ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘17 1.59 A $ ‘19 2.77 A $ ‘20 2.16 G SV‘19 5.72 
B ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘18 1.56 F $ ‘19 1.63 M SV‘18 1.97 F SV ‘18 4.01 
BD ‘17 0.00 M SV‘18 0.47 F $ ‘17 1.55 G SV ‘19 1.95 M SV‘18 2.26 
B ‘17 0.00 G M‘18 0.45 F $ ‘18 1.54 A $ ‘19 1.82 F SV ‘19 2.19 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 71.49 G $ ‘18 36.89 G $ ‘19 26.29 G $ ‘20 14.79 G SV‘18 13.09 
A $ ‘17 8.87 G $ ‘17 32.44 G $ ‘18 18.98 G $ ‘19 12.79 G $ ‘21 10.03 
F $ ‘17 5.11 A $ ‘18 4.83 G $ ‘17 16.86 G SV ‘18 10.10 G SV‘19 8.99 
C  ‘17 3.96 A $ ‘17 3.55 A $ ‘19 3.77 G $ ‘18 9.75 G $ ‘20 7.15 
P $ ‘17 3.07 F $ ‘18 2.75 A $ ‘18 2.26 G $ ‘17 8.55 G $ ‘19 6.54 
B ‘17 0.95 F $ ‘17 2.15 F $ ‘19 2.03 G SV ‘19 4.90 G SV‘20 4.91 
BD ‘17 0.27 P $ ‘18 1.81 A $ ‘17 1.89 F SV ‘18 3.13 G $ ‘18 4.91 
B ‘17 0.01 C  ‘18 1.76 F SV ‘18 1.64 A $ ‘20 2.15 G $ ‘17 4.34 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘17 1.62 M SV‘18 1.51 M SV‘18 1.98 F SV ‘18 3.46 
B ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘17 1.38 C ‘19 1.49 F SV ‘19 1.77 F SV ‘19 2.34 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
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Table B.10: Long Term Debt to Equity Contributions to Variation 
BASE CASE 
2017 % 2018 % 2019 % 2020 % 2021 % 
G $ ‘17 78.54 G $ ‘17 37.39 G $ ‘18 20.95 G SV ‘18 16.04 G SV ‘18 17.59 
A $ ‘17 9.01 G $ ‘18 33.80 G $ ‘19 20.57 G $ ‘19 14.50 G SV ‘19 11.16 
F $ ‘17 5.29 G SV ‘18 6.22 G $ ‘17 17.15 G $ ‘20 11.61 G $ ‘21 8.57 
B ‘17 3.40 A $ ‘17 4.39 G SV ‘18 13.34 G $ ‘18 10.40 G $ ‘20 8.49 
P $ ‘17 3.11 A $ ‘18 3.86 G SV ‘19 3.51 G $ ‘17 9.74 G $ ‘19 6.05 
C  ‘17 0.14 F $ ‘17 2.52 A $ ‘19 2.60 G SV ‘19 8.10 G SV ‘20 5.71 
B ‘17 0.00 F $ ‘18 2.42 F SV ‘18 2.56 F SV ‘18 3.31 G $ ‘18 5.27 
B ‘17 0.00 B ‘18 1.79 A $ ‘18 2.51 G SV ‘20 2.31 G $ ‘17 5.05 
BD ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘17 1.44 A $ ‘17 2.13 F SV ‘19 1.77 F SV ‘18 3.56 
B ‘17 0.00 P $ ‘18 1.39 A SV ‘18 1.39 A SV ‘18 1.77 F SV ‘19 2.31 
SEVERE CASE 
G $ ‘17 47.38 G $ ‘17 27.10 G $ ‘19 20.55 G $ ‘19 13.23 G SV ‘18 11.48 
B ‘17 33.41 G $ ‘18 24.87 G $ ‘18 17.50 G $ ‘20 12.04 G $ ‘21 8.91 
A $ ‘17 5.89 B ‘18 17.09 G $ ‘17 11.86 G SV ‘18 10.47 G $ ‘20 8.07 
F $ ‘17 3.43 G SV ‘18 3.71 G SV ‘18 8.39 G $ ‘18 8.77 G SV ‘19 7.94 
C  ‘17 2.36 B ‘17 3.65 B ‘19 3.55 G $ ‘17 7.31 G $ ‘19 6.37 
P $ ‘17 1.98 A $ ‘18 3.15 A $ ‘19 3.05 G SV ‘19 5.63 G $ ‘18 4.48 
BD ‘17 0.16 A $ ‘17 3.01 G SV ‘19 2.64 F SV ‘18 2.79 G SV ‘20 4.45 
B ‘17 0.00 F $ ‘18 1.89 B ‘19 2.44 B ‘20 2.29 G $ ‘17 4.01 
B ‘17 0.00 F $ ‘17 1.80 F SV ‘18 2.08 G SV ‘20 2.00 F SV ‘18 3.01 
B ‘17 0.00 C  ‘17 1.49 A $ ‘18 1.97 F SV ‘19 1.74 F SV ‘19 2.25 
Notes: $ stands for price distribution, SV stands for sales volume distribution, M stands for the Margin 
distribution, A stands for Agronomy, F stands for Fertilizer, P stands for Petroleum, G stands for Grain, 
B stands for the Base Interest rate, C stands for the additional interest rate based on the credit rating 
score and BD stands for Bad Debt. 
 
